

Party Organizer



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Opportunism Greatest Obstacle in Recruiting

THE strike wave rapidly spreading throughout the country is now taking on added tempo as more and more workers are fighting against the effects of the National Recovery Act on their living conditions. The militant industrial unions are gaining numerical strength in the process of leading hundreds of strikes throughout the country.

In these recent strikes, we have even succeeded to some extent in overcoming many of the weaknesses of the past, chief of which was our sectarian approach towards the developing of broad cadres of new proletarian forces. In the present strikes with new locals being set up, we have brought forward many non-Party workers into the leadership of the unions and struggles.

In this very favorable situation for the building and strengthening of our Party into a real mass force, we find our Party is not making the necessary headway. In fact, recruiting of these excellent new forces into our Party is still proceeding at a snail's pace in relation to the rapidly developing movement. Why is it that our Party is not growing more rapidly?

The main reason, of course, for the lack of recruiting is the lack of systematic planned activity of the fractions and units; the failure to select the best fighters in the shops and winning them for our Party. But behind these weaknesses there was and is even today, in many places a dangerous opportunistic approach to our mass work, which is in the main responsible for the failure to build the Party. In many instances, we find that recruiting of these militant workers into our Party is consciously pushed to the background. In other places, some Party members have developed the theory that our work of building the union will be hindered if we ask the workers who are participating in the struggle to join the Party. We have even cases where the Party units are prohibited from distributing Party leaflets to striking workers.

The danger of pursuing such practices can readily be seen in some of our recent experiences. The bourgeoisie very skillfully maneuvers with the "red scare." The A. F. of L. bureaucrats and other agents of the bosses use this issue against the Party and the industrial unions. Our Party fractions in the unions and the Party organizations do not sufficiently meet this issue. In most cases we still capitulate before the reactionary forces, fearing that bringing forward the Party in these struggles would endanger the strike or the building of the union.

Wrong Methods

In the practical application of this opportunist tendency we find the following experiences: the Party organizations (section committees, units, etc.) are working hard to make contacts and develop struggles in a given factory. After a strike breaks out, the Party organizations no longer act as a collective body, but our comrades as individuals actively participate in the strike and very often forget the Communist Party. The Party organizations stop functioning. The Party no longer speaks to the workers. No more Party shop papers, no more leaflets or meetings by the Party are arranged. Or else, the Party organizations are not disturbed by the strike. They continue their regular routine life, and do not realize that their revolutionary duty is to participate in every struggle of the workers. These comrades do not understand that there cannot be revolutionary life apart from the mass struggles. In both instances we have similar results. The Party's face is entirely hidden. The workers don't see the Communist Party.

We have in the struggles that have taken place, comrades who have been in the very forefront of the fight, who have gained prestige and the confidence of the workers. A Party comrade who militantly fights with the workers in their strike has in most cases no reason to hide or deny that he is a Communist. Who could better convince the workers about the Communist Party, than just this Communist, who fights together with them? And when is there a better time to build our Party, than during the struggle, when the Communist workers show the non-Party workers through their self-sacrificing, untiring activity that they are not a secret "red spectre" as the bosses and reformists want the workers to believe, but militant fighters in the defense of the workers' interests. This is the time when we can show the workers best, that we are part and parcel, flesh and blood of the working class. If we would consciously build around these comrades groups of non-Party actives, at the same time winning them for the Party, the tempo of recruitment would increase a hundredfold.

No one can deny that our Party comrades, our fractions in the industrial unions, in the A. F. of L. and independent unions are working hard during strikes. To recruit members from the factories or from the unions is not an easy task. The Party fractions and shop nuclei have to work systematically, selecting the best fighters, the most promising workers, and patiently, persistently develop them politically and win them for the Party. Sometimes we have to spend many days before we convince the worker that his place is in the Communist Party. We shall not have the illusion that radicalization

of the masses means that they are all ready at once to join the Communist Party, that only a general leaflet or a mass meeting is needed to bring them to our ranks. What is important above all, in addition to improving our political mass education of the workers, is this personal attention to individual workers, this planned recruiting of the new forces that are being brought forward as a result of the struggles. Unless this becomes an integral part of our work in the unions, we cannot conceive that our Party will march forward at a more rapid pace than heretofore.

Recruit Into Our Ranks

Our systematic planned recruiting in the factories and unions will develop more rapidly if we simultaneously strengthen and improve our mass agitation and propaganda. The workers should see the Communist Party every day, everywhere. The Party must explain all political events in leaflets, shop papers, meetings, through the *Daily Worker*. And in all of the activities in the shops, in the unions, among the unemployed and other mass organizations, we should recruit for the Party. No district, section committee, unit or fraction meeting should conclude without taking up correctly the problem of recruiting. The Party must be there where the masses are working, living, suffering and fighting, if we want to win over the majority of the proletariat. And in these places we have to recruit the best, most class conscious, most active, most courageous workers into our ranks.

Never before was the connection of the government with the bosses of the factories so evident as now. There is no economic struggle or strike where the N.R.A. does not play a strike-breaking role; where the city, state and federal administration does not directly intervene against the workers, through arbitration and with the aid of the city and state police, or national guards. In such a situation the Party and every single member of the Party has the revolutionary duty to bring to the workers on the basis of their practical experiences the role of the capitalist state, the essence of bourgeois democracy, the betraying role of the social-fascists on the one hand and the revolutionary role of the Communist Party on the other.

The Open Letter has stated that "never before was the situation in the country so favorable for the development of the Communist Party into a real revolutionary mass Party." This must be understood by every Party member. This should permeate the ranks of every Party unit. And with confidence and boldness we should not hesitate to bring into our ranks thousands of new workers.

—J. P.

Some Problems of Fluctuation

MANY times we have analyzed the reasons for fluctuation of our Party membership. Each time we have correctly attributed the disparity between the initiation and the actual membership to the bad inner life of the units. There is, however, another important factor which we seem to forget and this is the mechanical methods and inefficiency in handling new applicants.

There are hundreds and even thousands of workers who have applied for membership in the Party and have never gotten near enough to drop out because of the bad inner life of the Units and the fact that the workers actually never became members of the Party on account of inefficiency in handling their applications.

Neglect of Sections in Acting on Applications

Delay in acting upon applications or contacts is not considered a most serious crime by the units and sections. Sometimes applications are taken from the District and are never acted upon. Recently in going over the membership material of Section 4 we found about three hundred applications and contacts which have not been acted upon.

In checking up the records of the District we traced only six of these who were persistent enough to apply to the Party for membership, through other channels, and joined months ago. Some of these are now leading forces in the mass organizations in Harlem. What happened to the others, no one knows.

The same occurred in Section 6, Williamsburg. Scores of applications were found which were not acted upon. The reason given was that letters had been sent to the applicants but they were returned by the post office as "not found." On further checking up on the returns we discovered that the addresses were copied wrong and it was not the fault of the workers who gave them. We also found that upon return of the letters, the section committee didn't check back on the returns immediately and trace their mistakes.

Red Tape in Units Causes Delay

Contacts of workers wanting to join the Party are as a rule not taken care of promptly and efficiently. For example, in Section One, a worker sent a letter on January 16th asking for more information about the Communist Party. About six months later in June the contact card was sent to the District with a notation that the Old Broadway is not in their section. In other words it took the

Section 180 days to find out that the particular place was not in the territory of their section.

We want to bring another example. During March a woman worker who has been contributing to the Party sustaining fund applied for membership at a mass meeting. The application was sent to the respective section. In July four months later the application was returned to the District with a notation "cannot be found." By that time the applicant was already a member of the Party and had succeeded in getting in through other channels. We noted that the address was the same as that originally turned over to the Section. It seemed that the Unit didn't make a real effort to locate the applicant.

What happens in such cases is, that the Unit gets the contact from the Section. The Unit then assigns a comrade to visit the applicant. This comrade may not show up to a few meetings of the Unit after he gets the assignment. Such "investigations" cause serious delays. Often we find determined applicants full fledged members of the Party and functioning, having succeeded in "breaking in" through other channels before the units get through with their "investigation."

Blind Recruiting

Some comrades are too eager to get "credit" for recruiting workers in the Party. They don't take time to explain to the workers participating in strikes and unemployed struggles the nature of the Party that they are asked to join which often results in these workers, who sign applications, not replying or responding to the call to come to the Section for their membership book.

Very often they state that they are not yet ready to join. A typical case is that of _____, a Negro needle trades worker. During the last needle trades strike she was asked to sign an application for the Party. This application was countersigned by a responsible Party functionary and the membership book was sent to the Section without any delay through investigation or other red tape. The Section, however, kept the book for three months and then returned it to the district with the notation "does not respond." The district sent a letter and the applicant responded. When we asked her why she didn't call for her book and attend meetings, she stated that she was already attending meetings at St. Luke's Hall in Harlem and so we found out that this worker was attending meetings of the I.L.G.W.U. and thought that this was the organization she joined when she filled out the application for the Party.

—D. L.

Editorial Note

THE above examples show clearly the serious results of looseness in dealing with new applicants. It is one of the major factors which prevent many good elements from joining our ranks, which demoralize some of the new, enthusiastic Party members. These examples are taken from the experiences of New York district, but they characterize the general situation which prevails to a greater or lesser degree throughout the Party.

At the present time when the Party is leading many struggles, where new leading forces are springing up from the ranks of strikers, (among the metal workers, mines, textile, etc.,) more intensified recruiting is the way to build our Party into a mass proletarian Party. We must take steps to break down all hindrances which prevent workers from joining the Party. Because of the "red tape" in joining our Party too many workers are given the impression that the Party is a sect that doesn't want them.

Carry Good Decisions Into Life

How can we make the drive more effective and prevent the loss of good elements who are willing to join the Party? This problem was discussed many times and good decisions were made. These good decisions must now be put into effect and checked up:

1. *Each section should have a membership committee of five who will be responsible for the handling of new members in the section, under the supervision of the Section Org. Sec'y.*

2. *Applicants should be brought with their application cards to the section membership committee in order to avoid red tape and delay.*

3. *The section membership committee shall secure the address of the endorsors of the applicants (and the unit and section to which they belong) in order to establish the trustworthiness of the applicants.*

4. *The visiting of the applicants shall be made directly by the members of the membership committee. No sections shall be given credit for any new members on the basis of applications or paid initiations, but only on the basis of how many were actually assigned to units.*

5. *The captain system shall be re-enforced, not only with the view of a better distribution of work among the members of a unit, etc., but also to establish a better relationship between the Party members in the same group; notifying them of the next meeting place, etc. In this manner we will prevent the dropping out, es-*

pecially of new members, who sometime miss one or two meetings and are therefore unable to find their own unit meeting place.

6. *That all sections establish a unit for night workers.*

On the basis of the situations in the districts and sections, other steps can be taken to secure a more speedy procedure in admitting the new members into the unit and preventing the dropping of members.

Must Develop Section Political Leadership

In connection with this problem steps must also be taken to prevent the frequent change of unit leadership. As the case now stands, in some districts the unit leadership changes sometimes on an average of three or four times a year. This means that practically every member of the unit has had some leading function during the year. It is very good to develop the unit members, but this is not the way.

First of all we have to develop the unit buro as the real leader of the unit. It is only in this manner that the Buro will be able to develop the individual members of the unit to leading positions in mass work.

This problem has been discussed many times, and a series of articles were written, based on experiences. However, all these good experiences have not yet been co-ordinated, are not summarized in a small manual of instructions for unit functionaries—a manual which would explain the function of the unit, the different phases of work, the method of handling new applicants, leaves of absence, etc. This manual should also contain the constitution and program of the Party. This would not only help the leadership of the unit but also the new Party members, who many times join the Party because they realize that this is the Party that is leading the struggles of the workers, because they feel that they are part of the best fighters, but yet do not know completely the program of the Party.

"Is it possible to carry out such a turn? Of course, it is possible. . . . Now all members and all Party organizations must at once proceed to determine how the work of the Party can be improved and what practical measures must be adopted in order to guarantee and carry out the turn in the Party.

"The discussion of this letter must not take place merely in a general way. Every nucleus, every organization, every Party fraction must link this discussion up with concrete tasks, working out ways and means how to bring about immediately a real turn in the entire work of each individual organization, for the carrying out of this turn."—Open Letter.

"The systematic application of the united front in the big factories is of decisive significance in the question of leading strikes, the establishment of a united fighting front, and in tearing down of the barriers between the revolutionary workers and the masses of other workers. The decisive factor in carrying out this united front is tireless revolutionary everyday work among the workers, in order to prove in every question the correctness of our slogans and our proposals for action."—Open Letter.

Shop Concentration and the Strike of the Silk Dye Workers

THE general strike of 15,000 silk dye workers in Paterson and Lodi, New Jersey, is one of the most significant battles witnessed since the "New Deal" of misery for the workers was inaugurated. As an example of rapidly developing radicalization of the masses, as a militant struggle against the N.R.A. codes under the leadership of the National Textile Workers Union, in which the fight for unity of the workers has advanced to a new high level, this strike has many important lessons for the entire Party.

Here in this article, we deal with only one outstanding feature of the strike, namely, *that it began as a result of serious efforts to apply the Open Letter and to develop factory concentration in the dye industry in Paterson, and shows the decisive role which factory concentration plays in the development of strike struggles.*

Paterson is the largest silk dying center in the country. When the New Jersey district was organized, in the summer of 1932, the District Bureau attempted to turn the attention of the Party membership in Paterson to activity in the dye plants. For months previous to the outbreak of the present strike, the District leadership had been hammering away on the necessity of this concentration, trying to break down the resistance of some of the leading comrades in Paterson, who argued that they had no forces, that the big dye shops were not as important as the small broad silk shops where strikes occurred almost daily, that the dye workers were backward and would not respond to appeals for organization and struggle.

The District Bureau, however, was not sufficiently insistent upon a *plan of concentration* in the dye industry, and did not closely enough guide the work of the Paterson section to enable the comrades to find the necessary means for carrying out the many decisions on dye mill penetration. Consequently, the rumblings of discontent in the dye plants were not heeded.

The National Conference of the Party held early in July of this

year, the publication of the Open Letter, aroused the comrades in Paterson, as well as the District leadership, to the necessity of organizing and preparing the dye workers for struggle, of overcoming once and for all the hesitancy, the resistance, to concentration in the large plants of key industries.

Shortly after the National Party Conference, when the N.R.A. blanket code adopted by the silk dye bosses was producing widespread discontent and resentment among the dye workers, the Party section committee in Paterson and the N.T.W.U. decided to concentrate on the United Piece Dye works—on its Weidmann plant in Paterson and its mill in Lodi.

Personal contact was established with some workers in the key departments of the Weidmann plant. Through these workers, several group meetings were called at which recruiting for the union immediately began. For several weeks there continued close daily contact with these members, with workers of various departments. Scarcely a day went by without making definite advances in establishing connections, holding meetings, recruiting into the union.

Open mass meetings of the workers in the plant were held with the consent of the union members, at which the N.R.A. codes were exposed, the treacherous role of the American Federation of Labor clarified, and the policies of the National Textile Workers Union explained. Department meetings were called and concrete demands on hours and working conditions discussed with the workers. Recruiting into the union developed on a mass scale.

Finally, after several weeks of agitation and organization, when hundreds of workers in the shop had already been brought into the union and the demands had been agreed upon, a strike vote was taken and the strike of the Weidmann shop declared. *This was the first dye shop to close down as a result of organized preparation and action. The striking of this plant was a signal for other dye shops in the city, and several days later the National Textile Workers Union issued a general strike call to all dye workers which was a decisive factor in closing down all the dye shops in Paterson and Lodi.*

While the preparations were going on in the Weidmann shop, increased activity developed in the Lodi plant of the company, employing over 3,000 workers. There we already had a shop nucleus through which attempts were made to reach out into the various departments of the mill. The work carried on in this shop, together with the mass picket demonstration of 5,000 workers, made possible the complete shutdown of the mill, an outstanding victory in the strike.

During the first two weeks of the strike, a shop nucleus was organized in the Weidmann plant, and the nucleus in the Lodi plant

more than doubled its membership. The workers of the Weidmann plant, the first to be organized, are the most militant section of the strikers and are looked upon as leaders of the strike. While there were many objective factors making the strike possible, yet it is clear that the organized preparation of the Weidmann shop for strike was a decisive element in the general strike as a whole.

There were, however, serious shortcomings in the preparations for the strike and in the methods of concentration. We did not utilize our Party press, especially the *Daily Worker*, nor our literature, to help develop the understanding of the workers and raise their political level. *One of the major weaknesses was the fact that while the union was being built in the Weidmann shop, no serious efforts were made to bring the role of the Party before these workers, to recruit for the Party, to establish a Party core among the workers which would be able to give direct leadership in the forthcoming battles.* Furthermore, the Party membership as a whole was not involved in this concentration, activity being limited to a few of the leading comrades.

Another shortcoming was the delay in rallying the dye workers generally in Paterson, through mass meetings, leaflets, etc., to prepare for the strike. This delay, due partly to an underestimation of the readiness of the workers outside the Weidmann plant to struggle, and partly to an incorrect view that to concentrate means to take only one shop at a time, regardless of the need for a general mobilization in a period of strike preparation, made it easier for the American Federation of Labor to step into the situation and attempt to rally the workers in plants not touched by the N.T.W.U.

We did not quickly enough intensify our work in the Lodi plant of the United Piece Dye Works, although the unity of the workers in both plants was essential for victory. Where a company has several plants, especially when located close to one another, concentration requires increased and organized activity in all of them, at the same time that special attention must be given to the key plant in the group which may determine the action of the rest.

Despite these and other shortcomings, the work carried on in the Weidmann and Lodi plants following the publication of the Open Letter gives an example of the results to be achieved through concentration, the lessons of which must be brought before the entire Party membership in New Jersey and be utilized as a guide especially for the penetration of the steel and metal plants in the district.

—REBECCA GRECHT,

District Organizer, District No. 14, New Jersey

"Why is it that the entire Party, from top to bottom, is not working to determine the best ways and means for establishing contacts with the most important sections of the workers, learning to overcome their prejudices, speak a language they understand and persistently and patiently help them to organize the struggle against hunger? Why is it that the Communist fractions in the revolutionary unions do not make a concrete investigation of the weaknesses in the work of the revolutionary trade unions in order to overcome these weaknesses?"—Open Letter.

Review of Concentration Plan

THREE months after the Open Letter was issued to the Party membership, it is important first of all to review and analyze our concentration plan and methods used in carrying it out. For the first time our section has made an attempt to sit down and try to organize our activities on a planned basis. It is therefore very natural that mistakes have been made and shortcomings found.

One of the most serious mistakes in our Section plan is that while we have given a lot of time and thought in discussing a concrete and simple plan of work, we have not bothered at all about trying to get the necessary organizational forces (that is, the man power) with which to put the plan into effect. As a result of this mistake we came out of the Section conference with a very good plan but with no people to carry it out.

Concentrate on Marine and Metal

Our plan calls for concentration in two basic industries, metal and marine. I will deal only with marine concentration. We decided to concentrate on two docks, the ——— and ———. We figured out that after proper concentration on both docks for a few months we would succeed in establishing a Party nucleus on each dock and a dock action committee. This would make it possible to develop some kind of a struggle on the dock by the time the International Longshoremen's Association was to sign the new agreement with the shipping owners (Oct. 1st).

Perspective to Develop Struggles

The struggles of the committee would not necessarily have to be a strike; any small action on any section of the waterfront would spread like fire and from then on we would be in a position to develop this movement to its proper conclusion. But this didn't work out and the reasons are the following:

In order to accomplish the above it was necessary to do two things: First, to arouse the section membership to the importance of work on the waterfront to the extent where the section membership would feel it an honor to be assigned to work there; Second, that the comrades assigned come in close contact with the workers on the docks, and begin to acquaint themselves with the problems facing the workers on the waterfront.

Slow in Getting Forces for Concentration

It took two weeks after the Section conference before we succeeded in getting ten Party members who are at the present time functioning on the docks. Four of these comrades are at the docks from 7 A. M. to 2 P. M., their main activity being to mingle with the workers on the shape-up and to contact the best elements among them; four other comrades are responsible for the sale and distribution of the *Daily Worker* and other Party literature and to carry through Party open air noon gate meetings.

During the past few weeks as a result of these activities there has been an increase in the sale of the *Daily Worker*. A few months ago we couldn't even sell a single copy of the *Daily*. The attendance at the open air meetings has increased tremendously. At the last open air meeting every single man working on the Morgan line was present.

Why is it that the Party met with good response while it is more difficult to get response for the Marine Workers Industrial Union? One of the reasons is the fact that these workers, having been betrayed by the I.L.A., and seeing our union insufficiently involved in struggles on the waterfront, look with scepticism on unions as a whole. We can, of course, overcome this ideology among the workers by explaining to them through agitation and propaganda the difference between the role our union plays on the waterfront and the role of the I.L.A.

We are faced at the present time with the problem of finding a suitable form of organization (dock committees, action committees or the like) for the bulk of the unorganized workers through which to carry on struggles on a united front basis for immediate demands. Such struggles are a necessary prerequisite for the building of the Marine Workers Industrial Union.

In order to accomplish this, we must call together all of our contacts from the docks at a meeting and not only limit our meetings to small groups. The psychological effect is much better when there is a large group of workers. At such a meeting we should discuss and let the workers decide the form of organization they are ready to build at this time.

Must Build Strong Waterfront Unit

We are facing the immediate task of drawing in a number of workers from the docks into the unit so that we may be in a position to liven up the inner life of the unit by listening to some concrete facts concerning the conditions of the longshoremen on the docks. We must also bring into the unit an additional number of the best comrades within the Section, comrades who are pluggers, who will work, rain or shine; only then will the work be done, and struggles developed.

During the present election campaign it will be necessary to mobilize the whole Section membership for one day on the waterfront, for holding a series of open-air meetings at various points, to distribute a number of leaflets in the name of the Party on the election campaign, and to try to reach every worker on the dock with the *Daily Worker* and Party literature.

Mass Organizations' Support Important

The Section will immediately have to issue a special leaflet in the name of the Party pointing out the reasons for the postponement of the shipping code and what this shipping code will mean to the workers on the docks. Besides involving the Section membership on the waterfront it will be necessary for leading members of the Section Committee and the union to go around to a number of mass organizations, such as Katovis branch of the International Labor Defense, Gli-Grand Workers' Club, etc., where there are a great number of American youth who could be made to become interested in the work on the waterfront, and in this way try to draw some of them into the work. We should also try to have a number of mass organizations arrange an affair for the benefit of the Union, for the Waterfront Unemployed Council or the Unit and other means to involve the mass organizations in our concentration work on the waterfront.

Must Extend Work Among Negroes

There are a number of problems of great importance which we must tackle in our work. First of all, the question of work among the Negro longshoremen who make up as high as 50 to 80 per cent of the workers on some docks, the question of how to bring forward the role of our union to these workers.

I am sure that after a few months of continuous activity, plugging away along the lines we began and increasing the present tempo, we will gain years of experience within a few months and be in a better position to carry through our plan.

J. B.

Buffalo Foundry Strike Result of Concentration

ON June 10th approximately 300 of 450 workers employed at a local foundry went on strike against a wage cut ranging from 23½ to 31 percent. *This wage cut took place more than a year ago.* It was, until the strike, a burning grievance of the workers. Prior to the above cut there was a cut of nearly 50 percent in piece-work rates. The above figures speak loud but the words of one of the strikers speak louder, "we are worse off than the unemployed."

Every week for more than a year the employers deducted the 23½ percent to 31 percent from every dollar earned for piece-work. Every week the workers complained against this economic robbery but they did not know how to stop it. Unfortunately we were isolated from the shop. Recently, however, as a result of the slight pick-up in economic activity members of the Black Rock Unemployed Council and very close sympathizers were called to work in this shop. These workers, having experience in organization and struggle, sensitive to the grievances of the workers, reacted very quickly and correctly to those grievances. They immediately suggested organization and militant struggle as the way out. The response was splendid. The results of their actions and proposals were immediately reported to the Unemployed Council organizer who gave further suggestions on how to develop the struggle.

Our comrades decided: 1) that on pay day when the indignation of the workers was highest the broadest agitation be conducted for a strike for higher wages; 2) that the strike shall be pulled on June 10th because it was the most strategic time. The above date was selected because the company had a rush order that had to be gotten out by the 15th or else it would be given to some other company. These decisions were carried out. The result was that our former Unemployed Council members were able to pull out 300 men and march them a half mile to the U.C. headquarters where they held a meeting, worked out their demands, elected their strike committee, publicity committee, defense committee, organized their pickets into squads to immediately picket the shop to pull out the night shift. A collection was taken for the Unemployed Council to get out leaflets calling for solidarity of the unemployed and employed and assistance in picketing.

The entire shop is on piece-work. The workers are very bitter against piece-work. Consequently the demands were worked out on the basis of the abolition of piece-work. They were:

1. No discrimination against strikers.
2. Recognition of the shop committee.
3. No piece-work.
4. The 8-hour day with increases in rates of pay.

The above demands were presented to the employers. The employers refused categorically to grant them. After much discussion with one striker I worked out the following set of demands which I discussed with the strike committee:

1. No discrimination against strikers.
2. Recognition of the Shop Committee of the Union.
3. Withdrawal of the 23½ percent to 31 percent wage cut.

My position was that it would be impossible for us to regain everything that has been lost at one stroke of the pen but that we should compromise, that the tremendous partial victory would strengthen the morale of the strikers, that we should build the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union in the shop, elect a shop committee and go back with the determination to continue the struggle for the maximum demands. The workers agreed and when the strike committee presented the latter demands they readily accepted. The result was tremendous. The strikers were very happy and enthused. In a day and a half, as a result of the strike, they increased their pay from \$8 to \$10 more a week.

More than 300 of them have joined the S.M.W.I.U. They have their charter and meet regularly every Sunday. "Every worker a union man" is their slogan. They have elected their department committees and shop committee which are taking up the daily grievances of the workers. The chairman of the shop committee stated at one of the meetings, "we used to be short every week; now, since our shop committee has been functioning in the shop, we get every thing that is coming to us." This clearly shows that the best way to show the workers the value of shop committees and unions is by leading struggles for their smallest grievances.

At the very outset of the strike we considered the question of building the Party. The most active elements were singled out to be approached to join the Party. As a result we were able, when the strike had terminated, to have a shop nucleus formed. There are many good elements that will be approached to join the Party.

The outstanding mistake of the strike was the inability of the leading Party committee to mobilize the Party on short notice for participation in the strike.

—M. J.

Comparative Results of Recruiting

District	1932 January	1933 January	1932 February	1933 February	1932 March	1933 March	1932 April	1933 April	1932 May	1933 May
1	75	27	118	30	69	27	27	9	54	16
2	501	189	428	206	517	197	223	301	248	162
3	227	43	223	103	151	45	24	51	86	41
4	15	32	57	28	70	29	14	30	30	16
5	117	133	426	77	322	72	120	89	53	52
6	109	155	220	200	179	116	110	149	140	91
7	79	63	107	75	163	50	206	56	84	30
8	391	211	558	279	536	140	330	156	330	172
9	176	122	131	76	127	90	74	124	75	9
10	25	31	19	13	20	38	33	45	10	2
11	14	25	9	57	10	22	38	55	24	10
12	31	53	89	48	99	69	58	124	46	14
13	66	63	95	207	201	127	120	139	112	19
14	—	36	—	20	—	43	—	23	—	15
15	17	—	28	10	33	—	27	—	—	—
16	40	—	20	—	60	40	40	—	—	20
17	—	20	50	85	—	40	—	100	—	100
18	10	48	—	32	74	32	74	25	—	—
19	30	25	32	51	30	24	44	49	51	3
20	New District									
Total	1923	1276	2610	1597	2661	1201	1562	1525	1343	122

The figures included in this report show that in the first nine months of 1933 there has been a considerable falling off in the recruiting of new members into the Party. While in the first nine months in 1932 the Party recruited 14,983 members—in the same period in 1933 we recruited only 11,629 members. In the chart 12 Districts show a decrease and only 7 an increase.

An examination of the first three months of 1932 (Recruiting Drive) and 1933 shows that in 1932 we recruited 7,194 members and 1933 in the same period 4,074. These figures are very illuminating. They indicate that the recruiting capacity of the Party is being utilized to the highest degree only because of special recruiting drives as the records of 1932 show. The figures prove that recruiting has not yet become a daily task of the Party. The figures bring out especially the glaring weaknesses in this respect in the concentrated districts.

The records of recruiting of the months of July, August, September 1933 have special significance for the entire Party. These figures demonstrate qu

First Nine Months of 1932 and 1933

1932	1933	1932	1933	1932	1933	1932	1933	1932	1933	1933
June		July		August		Sept.		Total Rec'd	Comp.	'32
22	22	33	14	33	9	19	33	450	187	— 263
49	171	147	107	213	150	52	241	2478	1724	— 754
48	80	40	39	39	41	119	19	957	462	— 495
14	19	24	26	52	15	12	31	288	226	— 62
87	73	37	51	66	63	49	91	1277	701	— 576
24	65	105	59	83	70	155	94	1225	999	— 226
62	30	53	12	97	17	73	56	924	389	— 535
86	174	286	132	200	159	206	178	3123	1601	— 1522
15	50	122	44	92	71	70	83	982	753	— 229
18	21	38	36	24	29	40	29	227	264	+ 37
—	30	10	24	10	23	30	35	145	281	+ 136
56	167	62	83	41	79	44	97	526	865	+ 339
86	127	99	136	129	156	—	232	908	1379	+ 471
50	26	49	9	51	15	26	54	176	241	+ 55
19	16	43	8	10	7	25	34	202	81	— 121
20	—	20	20	20	—	—	40	220	120	— 100
115	78	90	52	—	162	10	115	265	752	+ 487
—	36	37	18	72	24	45	29	154(158)	252	+ 98
28	26	31	18	17	26	35	24	298	277	— 21
—	30	—	30	—	—	—	15	—	75	+
1299	1241	1326	918	1249	1116	1010	1530	14983	11629	

clearly and forcefully that recruiting is still very much separated from the mass struggle of the workers that the Party has organized and led in these months. These are also the months which followed the Extraordinary Party Conference where the central task put forward in the Open Letter was the building of a mass proletarian Party through rooting the Party in the basic industries.

The figures show that precisely in the months of bigger struggles the recruiting was weakest. In 1932, July, August, September, we recruited 1195 members; in 1933 in the same period, the recruiting is only 1188. The main reasons for this serious situation are enumerated in the resolution of the C. C. The concentration districts throw additional light on this problem: Figures indicate recruiting for first nine months in 1932 and 1933: New York—2478 and 1724; Pittsburgh—1277 and 701; Cleveland—1225 and 999; Detroit—924 and 389; Chicago—3123 and 1601.

Mobilizing Forces for Concentration

FOR years we have been concentrating on this large steel plant. The shop paper was issued, discontinued, then issued again with no regularity, no system, no perspective. Shop groups were set up, and after months of planless work and lack of concentrated attention, the groups disappeared. A shop unit was established which functioned for some time and it also was permitted to disintegrate.

Since the Open Letter a detailed plan of concentration on this plant was drawn up. But this plan was impracticable since it did not take into consideration the actual situation in the city, the forces to be utilized in concentration upon the factory, the elements inside the shop, the methods of agitation, etc., in order to realize in practice the plan worked out. However, we started work. It was only after we had succeeded in winning back two former Party members that the first work in the plant was begun. These two comrades were energetic, willing to do work but had dropped out of the Party because of our lack of systematic and persistent work in the shop. It was essential to begin in the most elementary manner to organize in the department in which these comrades were working and begin to establish through individual connection some organization in the shop. We discussed almost daily with these comrades the problems of their department and the possibility of organizing around grievances, against effects of the N.R.A., etc.

The workers in this department were dissatisfied. After receiving an increase of 15 per cent during July, they were still making only 44 cents an hour. They did not receive lunch on company time or pay for lost time and had many other grievances. It was around these grievances that the two comrades with the direct assistance of one of the leading comrades from the section bureau began the work in the shop. Gradually a group of 20 workers signed up with the steel union. But the workers demanded action. They formulated their demands and a petition was passed around the department to which, with the exception of but a few workers who could not be reached, every worker signed his number. The sentiment in the department was such that the workers were determined to walk out even before presenting the demands to the company. It was decided to send the signed petition to the company by letter and if no reply was received within the designated time, to elect a committee of the department to present the demands and then strike if the demands were rejected. The company ignored the letter of the workers. The committee elected from the various shifts in the department negotiated with the company represent-

atives, but received no satisfaction. The workers struck and within five hours won increases in wages and improvement in conditions.

This strike in the plant succeeded in stimulating the activities of the Party members in the plant, activated many comrades in the street units and was the first step toward making some inroads into the plant. Four fundamental problems had to be met by the section leadership:

1. Re-establishment of the Party shop unit, bringing back first of all, old Party members and transforming the shop unit into a force to build the union in the other departments, to build the Party and increase the circulation of the *Daily Worker*.

2. To orientate the entire Party, which was almost completely inactive, in the work of concentrating on the plant, to begin systematic activity in helping to build the Party and union through activity in the neighborhood and outside of the plant.

3. To spread the organization into other departments, utilizing the existing organization in the department which struck.

4. The developing of the local leadership in the existing union organization, recruiting the best elements into the Party.

How are these four problems being met? Immediately after the strike we succeeded in getting together the majority of the former Party members and re-establishing the Party unit. The unit is not yet functioning as the *Party* in the shop, giving leadership to the existing local and bringing forward broader political issues connected with the day to day issues the workers face. Already the unit is discussing the issues in each department, the establishment of department organizations, the issuance of the shop paper, and the role of the Party in the local union. The chief problem of the shop unit, however, is to win over some of the new militant elements as a step in the direction of transforming the life and work of the Party. This is being tackled by discussing concretely the names of those workers in the union who should be won for the shop unit, the gaining of *Daily Worker* subscriptions among these workers, the individual connection with these workers, developing them into responsible leaders of the union and showing them in this the necessity of being a Party member if they are to do more effective work in the shop. The shop unit has set itself the task of recruiting at least five members, during the month of October, into the shop unit from among these workers.

The second problem of drawing the entire Party membership into work of concentration still remains a chief problem that will have to be given considerable attention by the section leadership. The Party in the city is composed in the main of unemployed workers, many of whom have contact with steel workers in the

shop. The failure of the section leadership to show the membership how to really conduct its work in the neighborhoods so as to strengthen the work in the shop has brought about the situation whereby the Party membership does not feel the necessity of really helping to build up the shop organization.

The problem of the units remains in the main a problem of creating an understanding in the ranks of the membership of the real essence of the Open Letter, how to apply the Open Letter to the problems in the shop and to understand that concentration upon this important plant is the chief task not only of individual members of the Party or the shop unit, but of every single member in the Party.

The third problem was considered from the viewpoint that in this plant first emphasis shall be given to concentration on the decisive departments in the plant and from these departments spreading into others in the factory. The first steps were taken in organizing through Party members and one or two other contacts in another department, solid organization and calling of meetings of even small groups of two or three workers in as many departments as we have contacts.

Fourth, there is not yet a conscious policy in the Party or among the leading comrades of the union of how to develop the new forces that are coming into the union. Although the new elements have been drawn into the leadership of the local union, have come forward as the leaders of the union, they are not yet a conscious force who understand the difference between our union and the Amalgamated Association, who understand the program of our union, who can present this program to the masses of workers and win them for our program against the policy of the A.A. Especially is there still weakness in educating these workers on the whole purpose of the N.R.A. and the effects that are already taking place upon the masses of steel workers. The tasks laid down of establishing these local forces as the responsible leadership of the organization in the shop, of winning some of the elements into the Party, of carrying through an educational campaign on the N.R.A. by giving concrete examples of how it works at the present time, especially in connection with the mass struggles of the workers, are all immediate tasks of the Party in the city which have to be met if the Party as a whole is to grow and carry through the tasks laid down in the Open Letter.

B. G.

Application of Open Letter Brings About Change in Section and Units

THE following is the report of Section — on the plan of work adopted at the Section Conference.

First, we want to state here that the Open Letter has not been studied by all the Party members sufficiently.

In applying the Open Letter into practice we find the following:

(1) That the new Party membership is willing to carry on the work and is doing the work, but not in an organized manner precisely because the Unit Buros do not give proper guidance and leadership to the new members and the members as a whole in the units. There is too much mechanical application to the tasks of the units by Unit Buros.

(2) Since the Conference and the Open Letter we find changes taking place in the life of the Party units and the Section Committee itself. We have such members who cannot face difficulties, who have a pessimistic outlook on the whole situation and are really hindering the work of the Party. These are precisely the old Party members. This has expressed itself especially at the points of concentration. These comrades are hesitant, they cannot face the masses. They point out the difficulties, but do not give any solution. This ideology is being expressed at a time when the Party must make a turn to mass work, fearlessly and boldly, to win the decisive masses of American workers in the basic industries.

What is necessary is to fight to the end this ideology which prevails at the present time within the ranks of our Party and clean the Party of such elements and tendencies.

The Section Committee of Section 1 is determined to do its utmost in this respect and go forward and face the difficulties and at the same time overcome them by building the revolutionary unions and the Party in the basic industries in Section 1.

Now what has been done concretely on our plan of work? At the — shop we brought seven workers into the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union. We have there at the present time a group of eighteen members and a Party nucleus of twelve members. It is true that the membership is not active as a whole, but there is much improvement in the unit since the Section Conference. So much so that the shop unit at the present time is one of the best units in Section 1.

Secondly, our concentration is improving daily. Only last night we sold thirteen copies of the *Daily Worker*, and the following evening eleven copies, at the tractor plant, our concentration point. However, much more can be done. We are just beginning to do a little work there and are learning how to concentrate by taking part in selling the *Daily Worker*, *Workers' Voice* and other literature.

The flop-houses are another point of concentration. What has been done there? We have organized a flop-house nucleus of six workers from the flop-houses. We are calling a meeting once a week of the flop-house workers, also electing action committees in different flop-houses. The work is improving, although not sufficiently. We also organized a nucleus in a small furniture factory employing approximately fifty workers, and they are making arrangements to organize a group of the Furniture Workers Industrial Union.

Bring Forward Party Press

The *Daily Worker* and the *Workers Voice* are not sufficiently brought forward in our daily activities. It is true that we sell hundreds of copies in Section 1 territory every day, but the *Daily Worker* and the *Workers Voice* play very little part in the shop nucleus. There are no subs coming in at all from the basic points of concentration. This is because there is an under-estimation on the part of the comrades in the shop nucleus as to the importance of the *Daily Worker* and the *Workers Voice*. The papers are not brought forward in the daily activities of the comrades in the shops. The *Daily Worker* is looked upon as a separate problem. We have gotten a few subs, but not from points of concentration.

There is also a little improvement in our unemployed work. Some of the branches and the block committees are being activated again. Some of the branches are preparing open hearings, demonstrations at aldermen's homes, etc.

This, comrades, gives you a picture of what is taking place in our Section, and I am sure the Section Committee will do its utmost to carry out its plan of work in the light of the Open Letter.

—S. Y., Chicago

How New York District Got \$500 in Profit in Literature Sales

MANY comrades think that the successful organization of a literature department depends only on the amount of literature sold; the more literature sold, the better the department. This is only part of the battle-front on the literature field. There cannot be successful sales if there is not enough of the widest assortment of theoretical, propaganda and cheaply priced agitational literature. There cannot be a sufficient amount of literature if there is not a good literature fund or sound credit.

Realizing that the above was true, we did the following to guarantee the organization of the financial end of our literature department: We took up the question with the Workers Library Publishers, explaining how we wanted to spread the sale of literature in the New York District. We convinced them that we would not allow any of the money that came in from the sale of literature to be used for anything else but the payment of the bills. We also realized that we could not expect the Workers Library Publishers to give us our entire literature on a credit basis. We, therefore, managed to raise \$100.00 on which we placed a \$200.00 order.

We Raise Literature Funds in the Sections

The New York District started a campaign throughout the sections and the units for the immediate raising of literature funds in every unit and section. At first we worked strictly on a cash basis. We found, however, that this was quite a handicap in the proper sale and distribution of literature. We took up the question with each section literature agent. Where the comrade showed a definite understanding and personal responsibility and where we also saw that the section committee would give him full leeway and cooperation, we began to extend credit beyond the immediate cash payment. We also introduced the policy of taking back pamphlets that could not be immediately sold (that is, everything except the 1c, 2c and 3c pamphlets which can always be sold). In this manner the sections did not tie up whatever profits they had in a stock of slow-moving literature. The literature was changed on an average of once a month.

At first a few of the sections used up the literature money for their rent, leaflets or for some other important immediate purpose. Every time this came up we immediately brought this to the attention of the section, raised a protest and showed them that it is contrary to the Party policy to use literature money in this manner.

We found that by giving credit to the section that showed its responsibility to the literature, the sales went up immediately, a wider assortment of agitational and theoretical pamphlets were sold.

Following this policy we started to open up accounts with the various branches of mass organizations. Where the payment was slow, we tightened down immediately and would not give any more literature and saw to it that the old balance was cleaned up by visiting the branch, or by impressing the literature agent with the political importance of not tying up our money in dead accounts and thus stopping us from getting more literature.

District Cooperates in Extending Literature Sales

The district financial department co-operated to a great extent to make it possible for the literature department to build up its own fund by not demanding any of the profits of the sale of literature.

They were willing to wait for us to establish a credit with the sections and many of the mass organizations (about \$3,000.00), this credit being turned over in a period of between six and eight weeks. If the district financial department would have been short-sighted enough to demand money in advance, it would have stopped the correct functioning of the literature department.

The result of this policy was that about \$700.00 was given to the district up to the month of March; \$500.00 was given the latter part of September, leaving quite a substantial literature fund in the form of current stock, amounting to about \$3,000.00 on hand.

This can be done in varying degrees by each district and by each section, with the fundamental principle that literature money is not to be used for any other purposes; that all literature taken from the district literature department, whether for section purposes or agit-prop work, is to be paid for; a close and consistent check-up of accounts, not to allow them to become overdue; personal attention to each literature agent in the financial as well as organizational problems in his section.

Planned Work—Checkup—Only Formula Now

Comrades, in commenting upon the progress that was made in District 2 in the building of a literature department, ask, "How were you able to build this department? How is it possible for you to sell so much literature? What formula do you use?"

The answer is a constant check-up.

No formula, no matter how well put, will ever replace the above. Understanding the necessity of planned work, we called a meeting of all section literature agents. Each section literature agent gave a report on the conditions in his section. First, as to the literature

apparatus they had; secondly, the political development of the leadership insofar as recognizing the organizational value of literature in the Party work. Each section gave its suggestions and after a full discussion, we found that, in the main, the poor sale of the literature was a result of:

No appreciation as to the organizational role that literature plays in the building of the Communist Party.

The agitprops of the sections never connected up literature with their agitational work.

Very little, if any, mention of literature by the chairman or the speakers at meetings.

Very few individual comrades carried literature with them all the time for distribution in the places where they work, or in their mass organizations.

No attempts made to place literature in the hands of the unemployed Party comrades through a unit fund.

No check-up in house to house canvassing as to whether and how literature was sold.

Utilize *Daily Worker* to Promote Sales

These and quite a few other reasons were brought forth as to the poor circulation of literature. Understanding these problems and realizing that a good portion of them could be overcome by the education of the Party leaders and the membership, we started a campaign in the *Daily Worker* and in the *Party Organizer*. We issued a monthly bulletin on ways and means of selling literature, with personal experiences.

Although great progress has been made in comparison with the number of pieces of literature sold two years ago, we still find the following is true:

Only one section has a literature committee.

Practically no tie-up with the section agitprop and the section literature department.

Only 50 per cent of the units buy literature regularly.

Very little theoretical literature sold.

Still a great lack of understanding as to the role that the literature plays in a revolutionary movement.

We hope to further increase and improve our distribution apparatus by trying to overcome the above defects. In a district like New York, there is no question but that the literature department should be able to pay most of the wages of the district staff and this is the goal that we set ourselves to achieve. This will mean not only making it easier for the district office to function, but will also have the result of a tremendous distribution of literature in the hands of workers and the attending organizational results gotten from them.

—ROBERT FRANKLIN

"The necessary concentration of our work on the most important factories does not, of course, in any way mean that we should allow our work among the unemployed to slacken. In carrying out this main task we should not for an instant lose sight of the fact that we represent the interests of the entire class, and that, especially under the present conditions the unemployed constitute a factor of greatest revolutionary importance. One of the chief tasks of the Party is the organizing and mobilizing of the millions of unemployed for immediate relief and unemployment insurance and the linking up of their struggles with the struggles of the workers in the big factories—full-time, as well as part-time workers—especially now, in view of the introduction of militarized forced labor for the unemployed and the increased attempts to bring them under reformist and fascist influence. But the Party cannot carry out this task successfully unless at the same time it establishes its base in the decisive big factories. Hunger marches and other activities of the unemployed must be accompanied by sympathetic actions on the part of the workers in the factories, while the actions of the workers in the factories must receive the most active support from the unemployed."—Open Letter.

Force Unemployed Struggles in A. F. of L.

IN the past year or so, our Unemployed Councils have led many struggles for relief and against evictions, both in Iowa and Nebraska. In Des Moines, we put up a fight for more relief and also against evictions. The Unemployed League had quite a few organizations and had the semblance of a mass organization. By carrying on persistent work, we were able to build the Unemployed Council and win the respect and support of many workers who were following the Unemployed Leagues. Through our militant fights in Waterloo, we were able to win workers who were following all kinds of fake relief organizations. The Unemployed Councils in Sioux City led many militant struggles. As a result of this militant policy, the Unemployed Councils won for themselves a good reputation among the unemployed and employed workers; so much so that the American Federation of Labor was forced to invite us to take part in their state convention.

At the state convention, the delegates of the Unemployed Councils raised the question of Unemployment and Social Insurance and after discussing this on the floor, the convention went on record endorsing the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill. We took

advantage of this and a preliminary conference was held to plan a huge state-wide campaign for cash relief and unemployment insurance through a state-wide unemployed conference to be followed with a state march to the capital.

The Mooney campaign helped us to make an entre into the American Federation of Labor and we are following it up by involving these people in the fight for unemployment insurance. In the meantime, demonstrations for cash relief and for more relief are being held.

A similar movement is now going on in Nebraska. There, too, the Unemployed Councils have been able to establish themselves as the leaders of the unemployed through their militant policy. Through the united front policy of the Unemployed Council, a strike was conducted against forced labor in Lincoln. The prestige of the Unemployed Council has grown throughout the state. Quite a few new councils have been built around Lincoln. In Lincoln itself, the Unemployed Council is recognized as the leader of the unemployed even though there are a number of other unemployed organizations. Here, too, the American Federation of Labor has entered the united front, although they have a very small membership. The Central Labor Union has delegates on the united front committee in Lancaster County (Lincoln). A state-wide unemployed conference was held in Lincoln July 23rd-24th. To this conference came delegates from the A. F. of L., from the Unemployed Leagues and from the Unemployed Councils throughout the state. The Central Labor Union in Lincoln has also endorsed the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill. At the conference, the struggle for unemployment insurance was the central issue. The conference decided on a state hunger march. The state convention of the American Federation of Labor will be held in Omaha on September 11th and 12th. The state unemployed conference was asked to send 5 delegates to the convention.

At the Nebraska unemployed conference we established a state unemployed federation and decided to issue a state unemployed paper. The state unemployed paper will be printed as the official organ of the federation and supported by all the organizations that took part in the conference. This will give us the possibility of bringing more organizations into the federation and also to guide the workers ideologically; to bring experiences of the workers from all over the state and nation.

—K. E.

How *Not* to Carry Out Open Letter

A CONCRETE example of how *not* to carry out the Open Letter is given by Unit — of Section —, insofar as Party leadership is concerned. Under the cry of "mass work" the unit discussed for hours before finally electing a new unit bureau. All of those who had been most wordy in the declarations of agreement with the Open Letter, systematically and stubbornly *refused* to accept the nominations for Unit Buro. Such an attitude was taken under the flag of "carrying out the line of the Open Letter" and "being too busy with mass work." The result is that these "defenders" of the Open Letter elected a unit buro on which there is not one shop worker—not one trade union member—not one real leader of masses.

On the buro are one office worker, two housewives, all very loyal and devoted Party members, and a fourth comrade (why 4 on the buro is also a mystery) who for months has not understood the Party line and has defended a right-wing opportunist position. Even though he today declares agreement with the Open Letter, deeds must be shown before words can be taken too seriously.

"Mass Work" no Excuse

The arguments about being "too busy in mass work to accept on leading Party committees" are fundamentally false and contrary to the whole line of the Open Letter. The Open Letter states:

"The center of gravity of party work must be shifted to the development of the *lower organizations*, the factory nuclei, local organizations and street nuclei. . . . Every Party member, and especially every Party functionary, must be a real organizer of mass struggles in his particular sphere of work. From this standpoint the Party must judge the activity of its functionaries and must choose its leading bodies."

This means very definitely that it is just specifically those comrades who are "real organizers of mass struggles in their particular sphere of work" who must form the unit leadership, otherwise we will have a continuation of past bad practices where there was developed a theory of "inner party work" and "mass work." Such non-Bolshevik ideas must be burned out of our Party and the discussion and understanding of the Open Letter should have been the instrument. There cannot be two categories of comrades—those who do inner party work and those who do mass work. *All Party work is amongst the masses or it is worthless.*

The Open Letter states further:

"In order to effectively carry out this turn to the decisive sections of the American workers, it is necessary to carry on a persistent struggle against the sectarianism which expresses itself in all Party and trade union work. . . . All leading bodies, especially those in the sections must reorganize their work on the basis of the carrying out of revolutionary mass work. Revolutionary work is the task of the entire membership."

Buro Members Must Be Mass Workers

To elect a buro whose members are all isolated from mass work, shops and mass organizations, means to strengthen the sectarianism of the party units.

It must be emphasized that the unit buro must essentially give political leadership and organize the work of the unit, especially in the shops, unions, unemployed organizations and other working class organizations and is not just a technical body, which carries out some specific functions. The Open Letter emphasizes "revolutionary work is the task of the entire membership" and this must be organized and led by the unit buro.

The so-called "small" event in the life of Unit — is important because it shows that the Open Letter is being distorted in such a way as to make impossible its realization. Furthermore, the same tendencies exist elsewhere. The present prevailing characterization of Party functionaries, where leaders of mass organizations don't belong to the Party leading committees and where section and unit organizers don't belong to any mass organization or are not involved in mass work, is the very essence of the question of Party leadership that must be changed in the light of the Open Letter.

Carry Through Open Letter in Deeds

Unit — must immediately review its action and take such measures as will put it in line with the Open Letter in action as well as in work. This action of Unit — is only another substantiation of the Open Letter where it states in answering the question "why decisions are adopted and not carried out" as follows:

"Because in the Party, and particularly among the leading cadres, there is a *deep going lack of political understanding* of the necessity for strengthening our basis among the decisive sections of the American workers."

—J. W.

Plan of Work of Greek Buro of the C. C.

THE resolution and plan of work of the Greek Buro of the Central Committee on the basis of the Open Letter, while pointing out some achievements in the various fields of activity among the Greek toiling masses since the Fourteenth Plenum, at the same time clearly and sharply points out that this progress is extremely insignificant on the basis of the present favorable conditions—"the tremendous sharpening of the economic crisis and the new severe attacks of the bourgeoisie on the workers and toiling masses." Progress has been made in building up some new workers' clubs in New York, Chicago and Detroit, some good beginnings among the unemployed, the increased circulation of the *Empros* by 2,000, etc.

The Greek Buro of the C.C. failed to develop mass workers' clubs, and did not pay sufficient attention to the basic industrial cities and districts where hundreds and thousands of Greek workers are concentrated (Pittsburgh, Ohio, and Chicago districts). It must be recorded that the buro failed to develop opposition work in the reactionary Greek organizations.

The *Empros*, the official organ of the Party in the Greek language, is not as yet the mass propagandist and organizer of the Greek workers. The buro states: "The frank and sharp criticism of the Open Letter of all phases of work of our Party can be directed also, without any hesitation, towards the Greek buro of the C.C."

In line with the Open Letter the buro decided to concentrate its activities in the following districts: New York, Pittsburgh, Ohio, Chicago, Detroit and in the city of Baltimore where over 500 Greek workers are employed in the Sparrows Point plant. In the above districts the buro will concentrate on metal and food. The members of the National Buro were assigned to be responsible for certain concentration districts.

Tasks for Six Months in Light of Open Letter

The buro set itself the task to accomplish the following within six months:

1—To build six new workers' clubs in the following cities: Brooklyn, McKeesport, Canton, Youngstown, Milwaukee and San Francisco.

2—To double the membership of the existing workers' clubs.

3—To increase the circulation of the *Empros* by 4,000.

4—To recruit 300 new members into the Party with special attention to recruiting workers from basic industries.

5—Trade Union and Unemployed Committees to be established and activized in all the workers' clubs.

The buro in its resolution points out that "in order to be able to carry out our decisions and plans and to enable the members of the buro to fulfill their assignments at the points of concentration, *new* forces must be developed and drawn into the leading committees as quickly as possible." The first practical step was taken to draw in new forces with the establishment of the editorial board of the *Empros* of five members, which has already begun to function collectively. Further, the buro already took the necessary steps for the organization of a six weeks National Training School towards developing new cadres for the National Buro and for the basic concentration districts. The school will open the first week of November in New York with about twenty students.

Conference to Discuss Open Letter

Also, in line with its plan of work to help the fractions understand the significance of the Open Letter and to discuss with the fractions directly their local problems, the buro is calling a conference of representatives of the different fractions of the Chicago district and the eastern states for September 23rd-24th in Cleveland, Ohio.

As for the *Empros*, the buro is making serious efforts to transform the *Empros* from a sectarian propagandist paper into a mass propagandist and organizer of the Greek toiling masses. Already, in spite of all the difficulties, with a new inexperienced worker as chief editor, and the new editorial board, we can see some definite improvements.

It is about five weeks since the Greek Buro of the C.C. issued its plan of work. The district buros, especially in the concentration districts, are seriously moving forward to put the line given in the Open Letter into practice. The workers' clubs of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Chicago have already elected trade union committees and decided to concentrate on important factories. In the cities of Pittsburgh and Cleveland the trade union committees of the workers' clubs started a campaign for the organization of the food workers into the Food Workers Industrial Union. In Pittsburgh the committee has already recruited seventy-five members into the Food Workers Industrial Union.

In conclusion, the buro states: "The publication of the Open Letter in Greek and the resolution of the Greek Buro have stirred up the Greek Party members. We are confident that with the concrete plan of work before us and under the leadership of the C.C. we will be able to carry out our decisions and to put into effect the instructions of the Open Letter."

"Every Member an Active Member"--But How?

IN the closing paragraph of the "Open Letter" to the Party members, it is pointed out that "Every Party member, and especially every Party functionary must be a real organizer of mass struggles." By that, one would think that every Party member is assigned to a certain specific task—and his duty as a Party member is to see to it that he carries out his revolutionary work there.

But is it so? Let's go down to a Party unit. Usually the bureau report is read, followed by some points from the district and section letters and the assignments to the various comrades, and what happens—you find that comrades are assigned and only on unusual occasions are they assigned to the same work consecutively.

Let's say a comrade is assigned to help build the I.L.D. in his section. He goes there once, or perhaps twice, for several months, then, after getting acquainted with that particular work he gets another assignment and is usually replaced by someone else and the new comrade has to start all over again.

I think that this is one of the biggest weaknesses of our work. That is one of the outstanding reasons why we have such weak internal organization. The Party must make a sharp turn in this direction—we must make up our minds once for all to assign comrades to a "particular sphere of work" and to keep them there so they can become "real organizers of mass struggles in their particular sphere of work," and when we do succeed in this we will have gone a long way in carrying out the Open Letter.

—J. S.

"... Never before was the situation in the country so favorable for the development of the Communist Party into a real revolutionary mass Party. But from this it follows also that failure of the Party to understand its chief task—namely, to become rooted in the decisive industrial centers, in the important big factories—never before represented such great danger for the fulfillment of our revolutionary tasks as a whole."—Open Letter.